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ABSTRACT 
 
Labor Mobility in an Enlarged European Union* 
 
The 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU extended the freedom of movement to workers 
from the twelve new member states mainly from Central Eastern Europe. This study 
summarizes and comparatively evaluates what we know about mobility in an enlarged 
Europe to date. The pre-enlargement fears of free labor mobility proved to be unjustified. No 
significant detrimental effects on the receiving countries’ labor markets have been 
documented, nor has there been any discernible welfare shopping. Rather, there appear to 
have been positive effects on EU’s productivity. The sending countries face some risks of 
losing their young and skilled labor force, but free labor mobility has relieved them of some 
redundant labor and the associated fiscal burden. They have also profited from remittances. 
Of key importance for the sending countries is to reap the benefits from brain gain and brain 
circulation in an enlarged EU. For the migrants the benefits in terms of better career 
prospects have with little doubt exceeded any pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of 
migration. In conclusion, the freedom of movement in the EU provides for a triple-win 
situation for the receiving and sending countries as well as for migrants themselves, provided 
the risks are contained and efficient brain circulation is achieved. 
 
 
JEL Classification: F22, J61 
  
Keywords: EU labor markets, migration, EU enlargement, labor mobility, free movement 
of workers, transitional arrangements, new member states, European Union 
 
 
Corresponding author: 
 
Martin Kahanec 
Department of Public Policy 
Central European University 
Nádor u. 11 
H-1051 Budapest 
Hungary 
E-mail: KahanecM@ceu.hu  
 
                                                 
* Forthcoming in “International Handbook of the Economics of Migration”. The author thanks Amelie F. 
Constant, Klaus F. Zimmermann and an anonymous referee for providing a number of suggestions 
that helped to improve the chapter significantly. I remain responsible for any mistakes still present. 
 2 
Daughter: “What’s over there, Mom?”  
Mother: “There is nothing there – there is the East Bloc.” 
Conversation between a mother and her daughter pointing in the direction of Slovakia on 
a hilltop in Austria near the Czechoslovak border sometime in 1987. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The freedom of movement of workers is one of the four fundamental pillars of economic 
integration in the European Union (EU), which also includes the free mobility of capital, 
goods, and services. A central objective of free mobility is to enable EU citizens to seek 
employment, and any social benefits attached with it, in any of the EU member states. 
From the economic perspective free labor mobility improves the allocative efficiency of 
EU labor markets, thus buttressing the EU’s economy and alleviating some of its 
demographic challenges (Zimmermann, 2005; Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010). Yet, 
with the process of EU enlargement expanding this freedom to new member states, free 
labor mobility constitutes one of the most sensitive, and often challenged, freedoms in the 
EU.  
 
The controversies surrounding the freedom of movement of labor culminated when 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia, referred to as the EU10, joined the EU in 2004 and carried on in 
2007 when Bulgaria and Romania, the EU2, followed suit.1 These controversies were 
                                                 
1
 The respective abbreviations used in the text below are: CY, CZ, EE, LV, LT, MT, HU, PL, SK, SI, BG, 
and RO. EU8 denotes EU10 minus Cyprus and Malta; EU8+2 includes EU8 and EU2. EU15 includes 
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probably rooted in the history of deep political, economic and social separation during the 
Cold War. This separation had severely limited mobility and contact across the East-West 
limits and resulted in a fissure in the European identity along the Iron Curtain. 
Presumably the economic disparities between the new and old member states, combined 
with the large scale of these enlargements, created grounds for a widespread perception in 
the EU15 of EU8+2 migrants as a threat to their labor markets and welfare systems, and 
explain the magnitude of such controversies at least partly.2 As a consequence, a policy 
instrument – transitional arrangements – was adopted allowing member states to keep 
their labor markets closed for citizens from new member states for up to 7 years, with 
revisions required after 2 and 5 years, following their accession.3 
 
In the EU8+2 free mobility was seen as a way out of the difficulties stemming from labor 
market mismatches and excess labor inherited from the process of their difficult post-
socialist transformation. In spite of some fears of brain drain, overall, the expectations of 
faster convergence to the living standards of the old member states following their 
                                                                                                                                                  
Austria (abbreviated AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), 
Greece (EL), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), 
Sweden (SE) and the United Kingdom (UK). 
2
 Some of the early forecasts added to the fears in the EU15 by predicting rather high east-west migration 
flows (Sinn et al., 2000), possibly even undermining the welfare state in the receiving countries (Sinn and 
Ochel, 2003). More moderate migration rates in the vicinity of actual post-enlargement migration flows 
were predicted by e.g. Layard et al. (1992), Bauer and Zimmermann (1999), Dustmann et al. (2003), IOM 
(1998); see also Zaiceva and Zimmermann, (2008) and Brücker et al. (2009). See Canoy et al. (2010) for a 
thorough account of the links between public perception, migrants’ labor market outcomes, and migration 
policies.   
3
 Cyprus and Malta were exempt from such restrictions. Ireland, the UK, and Sweden opened up their labor 
markets immediately following the 2004 accession, while Germany and Austria imposed restrictions up 
until the end of the seven-year period, albeit simplifying some of the procedures.  The other old member 
states had gradually opened up by May 1, 2009. As for the 2007 enlargement, ten member states opened up 
their labor markets during the first 2-year phase: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden. By the end of the second phase on January 1, 2012, 
Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain opened up as well, with Austria, Germany, 
Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, and the UK still applying transitional 
arrangements as of January 2012. In July 2011 the EC authorized Spain to reinstate restrictions for 
Romanian workers until the end of 2012.    
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accession framed the expectations in the acceding countries quite favorably towards this 
process. 
 
This chapter reviews what we know about labor mobility in the EU following the two 
recent waves of enlargement in 2004 and 2007. We in particular evaluate the experience 
with post-enlargement migration in an enlarged EU in view of the fears and hopes 
attached to it in the sending and receiving countries, and by the migrants themselves. The 
next section provides a theoretical account of possible effects of free mobility in sending 
and receiving labor markets. We then describe how enlargement affected labor mobility 
in the EU, and what measurable effects can be documented empirically. In the subsequent 
section we shed some light on what migration flows can be expected in the near future. 
Finally, we discuss a number of lessons that can be learned, and conclude.     
 
2. A theoretical account         
 
To pinpoint the diverse social, political, or economic factors behind the reserved attitudes 
towards free labor mobility in the old member states and the more relaxed perceptions in 
the new member states would take a major study on its own. We undertake a narrower 
question here: does economic theory predict any worrisome effects of increased mobility 
for the receiving and sending countries? And does it in fact predict any significant 
migration flows in an enlarged EU?   
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The answer to the latter question is in all likelihood “yes”. Harris and Todaro (1970) 
point to the significance of (expected) regional disparities in the standard of living for the 
migration decision.  More generally, international disparities in the levels (and 
distribution) of earnings and income, net of migration costs, chances to pursue a 
rewarding career and avoid unemployment, the cost of living, or the availability and 
quality of public goods and amenities are proposed in the literature as key drivers of 
migration (Massey, 1990; Borjas, 1999; Bonin et al., 2008).4 Others, such as the 
generosity of the welfare system are more controversial (De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2006; 
Giulietti et al., 2012). Stark (1991) advanced the view that for the household as a 
decision-making unit it may be worthwhile to have one or more of its members abroad as 
a strategy of risk sharing. 
 
Factors such as those listed above may affect various subpopulations differently. The 
costs of migration and adjustment in the host economy, pecuniary and non-pecuniary, 
depend on the geographical, linguistic, and cultural distances between (subpopulations in) 
the sending and receiving countries (Chiswick and Miller, 2011). The human capital 
theory predicts that the migration decision also depends on age and skills of potential 
migrants, as these determine their capacity to adjust in the host country and thus benefit 
from migration (Becker, 1957; Sjaastad, 1962). As a result, people who decide to migrate 
and stay in the receiving country may be positively or negatively self-selected based on 
their observable or unobservable characteristics (Borjas, 1987; Chiswick, 1999). 
 
                                                 
4
 Besides these economic factors, family, ethnic, or social ties; natural catastrophes; social and political 
crises; as well as discrimination or persecution may result in significant movement of people (Mincer, 
1978; Massey, 1990).  
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Based on these arguments and given the initial disparities in many socio-economic 
variables, it is probably just to say that the expectations of non-negligible migration rates 
between new and old member states following the liberalization of the new EU citizens’ 
access to old member states’ labor markets were justified. Given the linguistic, cultural, 
institutional, and socio-economic diversity in Europe one could also well expect uneven 
migration rates across source and host populations. But are there any theoretical reasons 
to justify the pre-enlargement fears of various negative economic effects caused by such 
migration flows? 
 
The impact of migration on sending and receiving labor markets can be pinned down in a 
simple economic model drawing on the idea that the effects of immigration depend on the 
degree of substitutability or complementarity of migrant and non-migrant (native or 
staying) labor (Chiswick, Chiswick, and Karras, 1992; Chiswick, 1980, 1998). It is useful 
to consider the effects of inflow and outflow of skilled and unskilled workers in the 
respective labor markets. In Figure 1 we look at the effects in a receiving country. 
Immigration increases the supply of high-skilled workers from 0H  to 1H  in panel a. 
This drives the equilibrium and the corresponding wage level from 0A  to 1A , along the 
original demand curve 0hD . The increased employment of high-skilled workers, through 
complementarity between high- and low-skilled labor, increases the demand for low-
skilled workers from 0lD  to 
1
lD  in panel b. Assuming a competitive low-skilled market, 
given the supply of low-skilled workers at 0L , high-skilled immigration leads to as shift 
of the equilibrium from 0B   to 1B  and the corresponding wage increase. If, however, a 
(binding) minimum wage is set at Ulw , high skilled immigration reduces low-skilled 
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unemployment from 00 ULL −  to 
10
ULL − . Through complementarity of low- and high-
skilled workers the corresponding increase in low-skilled employment feeds back into the 
high-skilled market and so mitigates the initial decrease of equilibrium wage, increasing 
it from 1hw  to 
2
hw .   
 
Low-skilled immigration, on the other hand, decreases the wage of low skilled workers 
from 0lw  to 
2
lw  along the initial demand curve under a competitive market, or it increases 
unemployment from 00 ULL −  to 
01
ULL −  under a wage floor. In the former case the 
increase in low-skilled employment increases the demand for high-skilled workers lifting 
the high-skilled wage from 0hw  to 
3
hw .   
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
In a sending country, correspondingly, high-skilled out-migration increases high-skilled 
workers’ wages by moving the equilibrium from 0M  to 1M . Lower high-skilled 
employment leads to a lower demand for low-skilled workers, either reducing their wage 
from 0lw  to
1
lw  or increasing low skilled unemployment from 
00
ULL −  to 
10
ULL −  under a 
binding minimum wage. In the latter case this feeds back into the high-skilled market 
through complementarity of high- and low-skilled labor, thus shifting the demand for 
high skilled labor down, decreasing their wage from 1hw  to 
2
hw . Low-skilled out-
migration, on the other hand, increases low-skilled competitive market wage from 0lw  to 
2
lw , or decreases unemployment from 
00
ULL −  to 
01
ULL − , under the minimum wage 
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regime. By the complementarity argument, in the former case the lower low-skilled 
employment decreases demand for high-skilled labor and thus high-skilled wage from 
0
hw  to 
3
hw . 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
This straightforward analysis elucidates the redistributive consequences of immigration 
and out-migration. Clearly these depend on whether migration concerns low-skilled or 
high-skilled workers. Consider, for example, the case of high-skilled post-enlargement 
migration. The winners of enlargement would then be low-skilled workers in the 
receiving countries benefiting from higher wages or lower unemployment. In the sending 
countries, the staying high-skilled workers could also benefit unless the weakened 
demand for low-skilled workers resulted in lower low-skilled employment and, as a 
consequence, lower productivity of high-skilled workers in spite of their increased 
scarcity. High-skilled workers in the receiving countries could be among the losers of 
enlargement, but not if the increased demand for low-skilled labor resulted in their higher 
employment and thus an increased productivity of high-skilled workers in spite of their 
increased relative abundance. Low-skilled workers in the sending countries would clearly 
lose either in terms of higher unemployment or lower wages. One can similarly track the 
redistributive effects of low-skilled migration in this model.5 
 
                                                 
5
 See Kahanec and Zimmermann (2009) for more on redistributive effects of migration. 
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While this textbook model elucidates some potential redistributive effects of post-
enlargement migration, many other important factors may considerably change or even 
reverse some of its predictions. For example, economic migration can be expected to 
improve the allocation of labor and human capital. Moreover, migration proliferates 
cross-regional and cross-border social ties, thus acting as a vehicle for international flows 
of goods and services, capital, as well as ideas and knowledge (Bonin et al., 2008). The 
resulting improved productivity may benefit all types of labor in sending as well as 
receiving countries. Further economic benefits may result from increased ethnic diversity 
in receiving countries (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006)   
 
However, a range of psychological, linguistic, institutional, or legislative barriers, as well 
as discrimination, may impede immigrant adjustment in the host society, thus hindering 
some of the positive effects migration may entail (Constant, Kahanec and Zimmermann, 
2009; Kahanec, Kim and Zimmermann, 2011).  Such barriers may for example result in 
weaker labor market outcomes and, as a consequence, an increase in migrants’ demand 
for welfare (Borjas, 1999; Brücker et al., 2002; Kahanec, Kim and Zimmermann, 2011; 
Zimmermann et al., 2012). Ethnic identity is another factor that may positively or 
negatively affect adjustment in host labor markets (Constant and Zimmermann, 
forthcoming). 
 
Whether given migration flows should be considered as high- or low-skilled depends on 
the migrant’s skill level relative to the skill level in sending and receiving countries. The 
same migrant can thus be seen as skilled from the perspective of the sending country but 
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unskilled in the receiving country. A similar discrepancy may also arise if skills are not 
perfectly transferable from sending to receiving countries; the speed of adjustment then 
determines the effective skill level of migrants in host countries.6 Downskilling, whereby 
immigrant workers’ potential is underutilized in jobs below their skill level, has been 
documented also in the context of post-enlargement migration (Kahanec and 
Zimmermann, 2010; Kureková, 2011; Hazans 2012).7 Such considerations point out the 
importance of skill measurement when evaluating the effects of migration flows.    
 
This theoretical account of migration illustrates that the scale and skill composition of 
post-enlargement migration is particularly important for the evaluation of its effects in 
sending and receiving economies. For the receiving countries the degree and speed of 
adjustment of immigrants is another important variable. It also shows that without strong 
assumptions the effects of enlargement are hard to evaluate unequivocally based on 
theoretical grounds. Similarly, any a priori fears of enlargement are hard to justify 
theoretically. To evaluate the scale, composition, and effects of post-enlargement 
migration one needs to look at hard data. 
 
3. The scale and composition of post-enlargement migration 
 
The gradual opening-up of western European labor markets instigated by the 2004 and 
2007 EU enlargements enabled many workers from the new member states to seek 
                                                 
6
 See Kahanec and Zimmermann (2009). 
7
 Whereas the formal recognition of qualification obtained within the EU in another EU member state has 
been significantly simplified by EU legislation, informational asymmetries, linguistic and other barriers still 
obstruct the adjustment of within-EU migrants.  
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employment and pursue careers in the more prosperous part of an enlarged EU. This has 
dramatically changed the migration landscape in Europe and led to substantial east-west 
migration flows.  
 
Given the scarcity of migration data, to evaluate the scale and composition of post-
enlargement migration is a formidable task. We therefore look at various data sources and 
the available literature to triangulate some of the most important trends. According to the 
data provided in Holland et al. (2011), in 2004 there were about a million citizens from 
the EU8, and almost another million EU2 nationals, residing in the EU15.8 By 2009, just 
five years later, the total number of EU8 and EU2 citizens residing in the EU15 increased 
by about 150% and reached almost five million (Table 1). In effect, the combined 
populations of citizens from EU8 and EU2 countries residing in the EU15 constituted 
1.22% of the total EU15 population and 4.75% of combined populations of EU8 and EU2 
countries.9  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
                                                 
8
 While this dataset provides probably the most comprehensive account of migration flows between the 
new and old member states known to us, it has to be acknowledged that a number of issues arise with it. 
These mainly arise because of the lack of adequate infrastructure to collect data enabling us to measure 
migration flows in the EU. For example, data is often based on population statistics by citizenship, and 
changes in respective stocks are interpreted as migration flows. Deaths and births, legalizations, as well as 
citizenship acquisition, are included in these flows, although they should not be interpreted as migration. 
Latvia and Estonia are especially problematic in this respect, as these countries host large populations of 
non-citizens, who are treated in various destination countries in different ways. Data from Ireland and the 
UK are similarly problematic, as they are based on interpolations from the respective labor force surveys 
rather than large-scale administrative or census data, which may have large error especially for evaluating 
the sizes of populations originating from smaller source countries. Looking at foreign-born populations 
does not help to solve all these issues; for example, many migrants from the Baltic states were born in other 
republics of the Soviet Union. Various registers have their own problems, as migrants often fail to 
deregister. The statistics that we discuss below may therefore over- or under-represent true migration flows 
and need to be interpreted with these caveats in mind. 
9
 For 2007 these figures are slightly higher than those reported by Brücker and Damelang (2009) or 
Brücker et al. (2009), and in the range of those provided by European Commission (2008a, b).  
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Whereas over the five-year period preceding 2004 the average annual inflow to the EU15 
from the EU8 was about 58,000, in the five years after 2004 this has risen to 256,000 
annually. The corresponding figures for the EU2 were 129,000 and 330,000, respectively 
(Table 1). The dynamics of these flows are visualized in Figure 3. We observe an 
increasing dynamic of inflows from new to old member states until 2007, followed by a 
significant slow down during the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. EU8 citizens reacted 
to enlargement with some delay, with peak migration attained only in 2006 and 2007, two 
years after their accession. The response of EU2 citizens was considerably swifter and 
more pronounced, reaching peak migration flows already in the year of enlargement.10 
The slow down of 2008 and 2009 indicates that the worsened economic prospects in 
some of the receiving countries may have discouraged potential migrants.   
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
From where and where to did migrants from the new member states go? The most 
important sending countries are Romania and Poland, which in 2009 together accounted 
for three quarters of all migrants from the EU8 and EU2 in the EU15. Figure 4 shows that 
the numbers of citizens from new member states in the EU15 as percentages of respective 
source populations. A clear picture that emerges is that the most significant sending 
countries, relative to their populations, are Romania, Lithuania, and Bulgaria. The Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, and Hungary exhibit the lowest shares of their population residing in 
the EU15.   
                                                 
10
 That the 2004 accession took place on May 1, whereas in 2007 it was January 1, can at best only partly 
explain this difference in response. 
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[Figure 4 about here] 
 
As for the receiving countries, in 2009 the most significant of the EU15 host countries for 
EU8 citizens were Germany and the UK, jointly hosting 62% of them. For EU2 citizens 
the two most significant destinations were Italy and Spain, in 2009 each hosting more 
than 40% of all EU2 citizens residing in the EU15.11 In Figure 5 we distinguish countries 
by the period in which they opened up their labor markets to citizens from new member 
states.  
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
Panel a of Figure 5 shows that the growth in population of EU8 citizens increased 
significantly, although to a different degree, in each of the countries that liberalized 
access to their labor market as of May 1, 2004. Remarkably, many of the countries that 
opened up their labor markets later – including Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Finland, and Austria – have similarly experienced an increase in the rate of growth of 
their EU8 populations following the 2004 enlargement. A possible explanation is that EU 
accession removed some bureaucratic and psychological barriers to moving to old 
member states or that EU8 citizens circumvented labor market barriers mainly by coming 
as self-employers.12 In general, Figure 5 documents that populations of EU8 citizens 
                                                 
11
 The size of these populations needs also to be interpreted in the context of total immigrant populations, 
as people originating from EU10 or EU2 constitute only a smaller fraction of all immigrants in EU15 
(Kahanec, Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 2010). 
12
 Even in countries applying transitional arrangements restrictions for EU8+2 migrants were relaxed upon 
their countries’ EU accession. This includes preferential treatment in access to work permits vis-à-vis third 
country nationals, the freedom of establishment of a business for self-employed, and the freedom to provide 
services and thus post workers in the EU15 (excepting Austria and Germany). 
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continued to increase across old member states throughout the studied period, the rate of 
growth of these populations increased in the post-enlargement period as compared to the 
pre-2004 period, and a delayed liberalization of labor market access in some EU15 
countries may have diverted some migrants but did not prevent their EU8 populations 
from growing.  
 
Concerning citizens of EU2 countries, their access to most EU15 labor markets continued 
to be restricted throughout the studied period. Nevertheless, EU2 populations increased 
significantly in southern Europe, most notably in Spain, Italy, but also in Greece (Figure 
6). In Scandinavia, Bulgarian and Romanian populations continued to be rather small, 
although since 2007 there appear to be significant growth rates in Denmark and Sweden. 
Among the other EU15 countries Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Belgium hosted the 
most dynamic EU2 populations.  
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
The trends discussed above point at an important phenomenon that characterizes post-
enlargement migration, namely the geographic diversion of migration flows. Figure 7 
demonstrates that for EU8 citizens the relative importance of the UK, Ireland but also 
Spain as host countries increased substantially, while the traditional host countries, 
Germany and Austria, lost their share quite dramatically. For EU2 citizens the shares of 
Spain and Italy increased steeply, at the expense of mainly Germany, but also Austria and 
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France. The effects of this diversion may be long lasting due to the power of immigrant 
networks for the migration decision (Delbecq and Waldorf, 2010). 
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
As concerns the skill composition of citizens from new member states residing in the 
EU15 in the early post-enlargement period, a number of early studies indicate that the 
majority of EU8 immigrants had medium educational attainment, and almost a quarter of 
them attained high education (European Commission 2008b; Brücker and Damelang 
2009; Bruecker et al. 2009). Brücker and Damelang report that in 2006 among EU8 
migrants in the EU15 17% had low and 22% had high educational attainment. The 
corresponding figures for EU2 migrants were 29% and 18%. Among the natives in the 
EU15 there were 27% of them with low and the same percentage with high educational 
attainment. Holland et al. (2011) find that Luxembourg, Demark, Sweden, and Ireland are 
most popular among high-skilled workers while low-skilled workers are more likely to go 
to Greece, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands, and Finland. Furthermore, this study 
finds that for most of the EU8+2 countries’ migrants heading to the EU15 over-represent 
the high- (except for Estonia, Slovenia, and Lithuania) as well as low-skilled (excepting 
Hungary and Latvia) domestic populations, but under-represent the medium-skilled 
population.   
 
A book edited by Kahanec and Zimmermann (2010) systematically summarizes the 
available evidence on the scale, composition, and effects of free labor mobility in the 
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early post-enlargement period. Kahanec, Zaiceva, and Zimmermann (2010) provide a 
broad account of post-enlargement migration in the EU documenting the cross-country 
differences in the scale and composition of these flows and their effects. They in 
particular argue that EU enlargement has had different effects in countries that opened up 
their labor market early on, such as the UK, and those that strictly applied transitional 
arrangements, such as Germany. For example, they document that while the skill 
composition of EU8 immigrants improved after enlargement in the UK, it worsened in 
Germany. Blanchflower and Lawton (2010) report that in the UK EU8 migrants had a 
high incidence of self-employment and high employment rates, and were well skilled. 
Barrett (2010) finds that the EU10 migrants in Ireland had very high employment rates 
and levels of education comparable to the natives. He also finds evidence for 
downskilling accompanied by relatively lower wages.  
 
Brenke, Yuksel, and Zimmernann (2010) document that post-enlargement migrants from 
the EU8 in Germany were predominantly male and young but were less educated and 
older than EU8 migrants had been previously. The authors also report higher self-
employment rates but lower earnings and lower quality jobs for these immigrants. Self-
employment rates as high as 38% for post-enlargement migrants from the EU10 in 
Germany and 51% for those coming from EU2 in the UK in 2007 reported by European 
Commission (2008b) may signify inefficient spurious self-employment as a way to 
circumvent transitional arrangements imposed in these cases. A study by de la Rica 
(2010) reports that EU8+2 immigrants in Spain were predominantly young and had 
secondary education, allowing them to achieve high employment rates, but they also 
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struggled with relatively high unemployment. Importantly, she also reports lack of 
adjustment as concerns job quality. Gerdes and Wadensjö (2010) find that in Sweden 
post-enlargement migrants were relatively young and highly educated, but their earnings 
and employment rates were not as high as those of the natives. While before enlargement 
immigration to Sweden from the EU10 was dominated by females, in the post-
enlargement its gender composition became much more even. A preliminary comparative 
evaluation of these experiences with post-enlargement migration in Europe indicate that 
transitional arrangements backfired in that they implied a negative selection of incoming 
workers in terms of their skills and age (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010).   
 
Kaczmarczyk, Mioduszewska, and Żylicz (2010) provide evidence on the main sending 
country, Poland, arguing that the economic effects of relatively large out-migration are 
moderate. They propose that post-enlargement migration may foster the process of 
modernization in Poland, to the extent brain circulation facilitates restructuring and a 
higher allocative efficiency.  Hazans and Philips (2010) and Hazans (2012) find that in 
the Baltic states’ post-enlargement migrants were significantly less educated than stayers, 
with medium-skilled workers being most likely to move after accession. They do not find 
evidence for brain drain but report significant brain waste in the form of downskilling.  
 
Galgóczi, Leschke, and Watt (2012) enrich the literature by shedding light on skill-
mismatches in an enlarged EU and the role of trade unions in bridging these mismatches. 
Using an innovative web-based survey WageIndicator, Tijdens and van Klaveren (2012) 
document that among EU15 residents born in the EU10 only 65 percent report a correct 
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job-education match compared to 74% for the whole sample and 72% for all migrants. 
Kureková (2011) stresses the importance of skill-mismatches in the sending EU10 
countries, and their interaction with the welfare state for the scale and composition of 
post-enlargement migration flows.  
 
In our own analysis based on the 2009 wave of the EU Labour Force Survey we 
reconstruct immigrant cohorts using the year of arrival for residents born in the EU10 and 
EU2. We consider the population above and including 16 years of age, excluding 
conscripts on compulsory military or community service as well as anyone whose highest 
level of education or training successfully completed was attained after his or her 
immigration to the current country of residence in the EU15. Figure 8 reports the shares 
of EU10 and EU2 immigrants with high, medium, and low level of education.13 We 
observe that with enlargement the share of EU10 migrants with high educational 
attainment residing in the EU15 increased substantially.14 Interestingly, the share of 
highly educated EU10 migrants increased already in 2003, which might indicate that 
even the prospect of impending EU accession sealed already in 2003 attracted many 
educated EU10 citizens. We also observe that during the first three years following the 
accession the share of low educated EU10 migrants was lower than before accession. In 
2007 and 2009 we however observe somewhat higher shares of low educated EU10 
migrants. This is consistent with the findings in the literature that the proportion of high- 
                                                 
13
 High level of education includes ISCED 5 and 6 levels; medium level of education comprises ISCED 3 
and 4 levels; and low level of education takes in ISCED 0, 1 and 2 levels. For further details about this 
classification see UNESCO (1997). 
14
 Given the construction of the sample, were the propensity to stay in the host country positively correlated 
with a migrant’s educational attainment (Hazans (2012) shows this to be the case for the Baltic states 
before enlargement as well as since 2006), our results would underreport the true improvement in the skill 
composition of immigrants from the new member states.   
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but also low-educated migrants from the EU10 in several EU15 countries increased after 
the 2004 enlargement.15  
 
[Figure 8 about here] 
 
As concerns the effects of the 2007 EU enlargement on EU2 migrants in the EU15, we 
observe a steady share of high-educated and an increasing share of low-educated 
migrants among them during the initial period 2007-2008, followed by a steep increase in 
the share of high-educated migrants and a similarly sharp decrease in the share of low-
educated ones in 2009. Whether this signifies a reversal of the trend of decreasing share 
of high-educated and an increasing share of low-educated EU2 migrants in the EU 
observed during 2001-2007 and to what extent this is caused by Romania’s and 
Bulgaria’s EU accession remains to be seen when more recent data become available.  
 
In 2009 among EU10 nationals in the EU15 the share of high educated was 26.1% and 
low educated 22.5%; i.e. they were considerably more educated than EU2 nationals in the 
EU15 of whom 12.2% were high and 37.5% low educated. They were more educated 
than the total population in the EU15 with 18.9% high and 45.7% low educated residents. 
EU10 as well as EU2 nationals in the EU15 were each positively selected compared to 
their source populations, with 14.4% high educated and 27.4% low educated residents in 
EU10 and 10.3% high educated and 40.9% low educated residents in EU2. Most of these 
results stay valid if we look at prime working age population (25-54), except that EU2 
migrants then appear to be negatively selected form their source population. 
                                                 
15
 See Kahanec and Zimmermann (2010). 
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4. The effects of post-enlargement migration in receiving and sending countries 
 
To evaluate the effects of post-enlargement migration in an enlarged EU we consider the 
welfare of three key stakeholders to this process: the sending countries, the receiving 
countries, and the migrants themselves. Migrants from the new member states in the 
EU15 appear to be overrepresented in low- and medium-skilled occupations and sectors, 
such as construction, manufacturing, hotels and restaurants, and agriculture (Kahanec, 
Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 2010). Given their relatively favorable skill-composition 
discussed above, this discrepancy signifies a degree of downskilling and possibly brain 
waste. Accompanied with the separation from their families and relatives in their 
countries of origin, it is not too surprising that this leads to lack of satisfaction with their 
migration experience (Anderson et al. 2006; Blanchflower and Lawton, 2010).  
 
In spite of their possible dissatisfaction with some aspects of their experience as migrants, 
post-enlargement migrants can hardly be considered elsewhere but among the winners of 
free labor mobility in the EU. Given the wage and unemployment gaps between sending 
and receiving countries, post-enlargement migrants have benefited in terms of higher 
salaries, improved career prospects, and a generally higher standard of living in the 
EU15. Improved human capital and language skills in particular add to the benefits of 
their migration experience in the EU15. Kureková (2011) finds that potential employers 
value migrant’s work experience acquired abroad upon their return, especially if they are 
young. By the revealed preferences argument, the sum of these benefits should exceed 
the pecuniary, but also psychological and social, costs migration typically entails.     
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As concerns the effects on receiving countries, the available empirical evidence paints a 
rather positive picture. Very small if any effects of post-enlargement migration on the 
unemployment rate or wages are found in the UK (Gilpin et al., 2006; Blanchflower 
Saleheen, and Shadforth, 2007; Lemos and Portes, 2008). Blanchflower and Lawton 
(2010) detect small effects in the least skilled sectors. Blanchflower and Shadforth (2009) 
and Blanchflower, Saleheen, and Shadforth (2007) point at the importance of 
immigration and the resulting fear of unemployment for suppressing inflationary 
pressures. Doyle, Hughes, and Wadensjö (2006) and Hughes (2007) report a similar 
picture for Ireland, where post-enlargement immigration might have caused some 
substitution and a temporary slow-down of wage growth in some sectors, but any 
displacement at the micro level was not affecting aggregate unemployment and the 
effects on wage growth reversed soon.  
 
Brenke, Yuksel, and Zimmermann (2010) find that EU8 migrants compete with 
immigrants from outside of Europe for low-skilled jobs rather than with the natives. This 
may have been one of the causes behind the 50% drop in immigration from other 
important source countries, including Russia, Ukraine and Turkey, from 2004 to 2006 
reported by these authors. Barrett (2010) argues that post-enlargement immigration 
helped Ireland to moderate the rather high wage growth during the pre-2008 boom, which 
helped the country in terms of GNP growth. Kahanec and Zimmermann (2009) show that 
high-skilled immigration can be expected to decrease inequality, which highlights the 
importance of adjustment of high skilled migrants into corresponding jobs. As concerns 
the feared effects on the receiving countries’ welfare systems, they have been shown to 
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be unjustified (Gerdes and Wadensjö, 2010; Doyle, 2007; Hughes, 2007). Giulietti et al. 
(2012) reject the welfare magnet hypothesis for migration within and into the EU. 
 
The massive outflow of workers from some of the EU10 and EU2 countries has sparked 
some fears that the risks of EU enlargement may actually be borne by the new member 
states. Kadziauskas (2007) warns that on the background of adverse demographic trends, 
the Lithuanian social security system may collapse due to post-enlargement out-
migration. Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008) and Kadziauskas (2007) report growing 
shortages in some segments of the labor market soon after Poland’s and Lithuania’s EU 
accession. Kureková (2011) reports significant skill shortages in Slovakia in the post-
enlargement period. A new trend in the sending countries has emerged, whereby such 
skill shortages are filled in by immigrants from outside the EU, mainly from Ukraine, 
Belarus, Russia, and some Balkan countries (Frelak and Kazmierkiewicz, 2007; Iglicka , 
2005; Kureková, 2011). Kaminska and Kahancová (2011) report that in Slovakia post-
enlargement outmigration enabled trade unions to obtain wage increases.  
 
An important consideration for the sending countries is to what extent post-enlargement 
out-migration represents a lasting loss of labor and human capital and to what extent it 
might signify the beginning of an era of brain gain and circulation. Early studies suggest 
that there were no signs of significant brain drain, although some skilled sectors, such as 
medical doctors, lost non-negligible proportions of their workforce (Frelak and 
Kazmierkiewicz, 2007; Brücker et al. 2009; European Commission, 2008b; Hazans 
2012). The negative selection into return migration observed for migrants from the Baltic 
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states more recently (Hazans, 2012) may pose some risks for the growth potential and 
sustainability of social security in the sending countries.         
 
Also important is to what extent the gains from migration are transmitted to the left-
behinds in the form of remittances. Kahanec, Zaiceva, and Zimmermann (2010) report an 
increasing importance of remittances in a number of sending countries, most significantly 
in Bulgaria and Romania, but also the Baltic states. In Romania and Bulgaria remittances 
constituted about 5 percent of their GDP in 2007 (Dietz, 2009). Comini and Faes-Cannito 
(2010) report that the overall volume of remittances to the EU8 and EU2 declined in 
2009 after years of growth, probably due to the worsened economic situation in the host 
economies due to the financial crisis. Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008) document that 
remittances were primarily used for consumption and durable goods during the early 
post-enlargement period, but also report that more recently they have been invested in 
human capital as well. Remittances thus could partly compensate the sending countries 
for the possible brain drain.      
 
In a general equilibrium model Baas, Brücker, and Hauptman (2010) argue that the 
aggregate GDP of an enlarged EU can be expected to increase by about 0.2%, or 24 
billion Euros, from 2004 to 2007 as a consequence of post-enlargement migration from 
the EU8 alone. This implies 28,571 EUR per post-enlargement migrant. European labor 
markets seem to absorb these flows quite seamlessly, with wages declining by up to 0.1% 
in the EU15 and the unemployment rate increasing by about 0.1 percentage points. For 
the sending EU8 countries they predict a decline of unemployment of about 0.4 
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percentage points and an increase in wages by about 0.3%. In the long run, however, they 
predict no effects on wages or unemployment in the sending or receiving countries. 
Similar effects are predicted by Holland et al. (2011), although given a slightly different 
modeling approach, the authors predict lasting effects on real wages.  
 
Constant (2011) summarizes this evidence to conclude that the pre-enlargement fears of 
labor market disruptions to be caused by immigrants from the new member states were 
by and large unjustified. To the contrary, she maintains the migrants and the receiving as 
well as the sending countries gained from increased labor mobility in an enlarged EU.    
 
5. The potential for further post-enlargement migration 
 
To shed light on what migration flows can be expected in the foreseeable future, one can 
look at current migration intentions. Drawing on Eurostat (2010), Figure 9 reports the 
shares of a country’s population that envisage working in another country. One can see 
an interesting pattern across an enlarged EU, whereby the most mobile appear to be 
Scandinavians, with more than half of the Danes reporting positive intentions. Next and 
very close come the Baltic states in each of which more than a third of the population 
answered “yes”. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, at least in view of their relatively low 
out-migration rates following their EU accession, Hungary and Slovenia exhibit higher 
shares of people who envisage working outside of their country than Poland or Slovakia, 
and all exhibit greater shares than seen in Bulgaria and Romania. Probably the main 
explanatory factors behind these figures are the relatively adverse economic situation in 
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Slovenia and Hungary, and the comparatively good economic prospects of Slovakia and 
especially Poland in late 2009. The low migration intentions of Bulgarians and 
Romanians may have to do with the unfavorable economic prospects in some of their 
main destination countries in southern Europe. As concerns which destination countries 
are preferred by EU8 workers, according to Eurostat (2010) it is mainly Germany 
(25.4%) and the UK (25.3%), followed by Austria (13.5%). Workers from EU2 countries 
mainly prefer Italy (17.0%), Spain (14.5%) and Germany (14.5%), but also the UK 
(11.5%).16    
 
[Figure 9 about here] 
 
A key question is how concrete the intentions in Figure 9 are. Figure 10 reports the 
answers of those respondents who envisage working in a country outside their own 
country at some time in the future to the question about when they expect it to happen. 
The results indicate that migration intentions are most imminent in the Baltic states as 
well as Romania and Bulgaria. The remaining new member states, Slovakia and Poland 
do not differ very much from the EU27 average, whereas Slovenia, the Czech Republic, 
and Hungary exhibit the lowest imminence of migration intentions.  
 
[Figure 10 about here] 
 
                                                 
16
 Simple averages for the EU8 and EU2 countries of shares of respondents indicating preference for the 
respective country in parenthesis, Eurostat (2010). Based on spontaneous possibly multiple responses 
including countries outside the EU. For the sake of comparison, the US as the most preferred non-EU 
country was indicted by 11.3% of EU8 respondents and 12.0% of EU2 respondents. 
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To answer the question from which new member states one can expect the highest 
migration outflows in the foreseeable future, we construct a simple analytical migration 
imminence matrix using the data on migration intentions as reported in Figures 9 and 10. 
We namely plot in Figure 11 the share of population envisaging work abroad against the 
share of those of them who indicate that they expect to work there during the next six 
months (Panel a) and, as a robustness check, during the next twelve months (Panel b).17 
We then interpret the distance from the origin as a measure a country’s imminent 
migration potential. In particular, countries that fall into the south-west quadrant of the 
migration imminence matrix can be interpreted to have low imminent out-migration 
potential. This includes the Czech Republic but also, somewhat surprisingly, Poland and 
Slovakia. This may indicate that the migration potential of these countries had been 
already partly exhausted by the end of 2009. The countries that fall into the north-west 
quadrant, Romania and Bulgaria, exhibit relatively low shares of people planning to work 
abroad. However, for a relatively large share of those planning to work abroad the 
indicated plans seem to be rather imminent. 
 
 
[Figure 11 about here] 
 
Slovenia and Hungary fall into the south-east quadrant with relatively high share of 
people envisaging work abroad, but only a relatively small share of them indicated this to 
happen during the next six months. With Hungary and Slovenia sharing a weak economic 
prospect in late 2009 and up until then relatively low out-migration rates, a possible 
                                                 
17
 These shares are normalized on the interval [0,1] to range between the respective minimums and 
maximums observed in the EU. 
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interpretation is that in these countries larger numbers of people were starting to consider 
the option of finding a job abroad, but their plans were relatively recent and not concrete 
yet.  
 
The highest imminent migration potential is observed in Lithuania and Latvia in the 
north-east quadrant, which in 2009 exhibited a relatively high share of people expecting 
to work abroad and for this to happen during the next six months. Estonia is the 
borderline case with the largest share of people expecting to work abroad in the future 
among the EU8+2 countries, although the share of people expecting this to happen during 
the next six months is considerably lower than in Latvia and Lithuania and is close to the 
EU8+2 simple average. The high degree of similarity between panels a and b indicates 
that these findings are robust within the studied horizon of migration intentions.       
 
Based on the migration imminence matrix we can thus conjecture that following the 
survey the Baltic states were going to continue to send relatively large numbers of 
workers abroad. Romania and Bulgaria still exhibited significant migration potential, but 
perhaps some of it has been exhausted by the end of 2009. Such migration fatigue seems 
to be even more evident for Slovakia and Poland. The Czech Republic had not been 
sending many migrants abroad, and it appears that its low migration potential was not 
going to change soon after 2009. Hungary and Slovenia, however, may be the coming 
sources of migrants with a larger share of people considering working abroad, although 
still without firm short-run plans in late 2009.  
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To fully grasp the prospects of future migration between the new and old member states, 
it is necessary to understand the prospect of return migration as well. Migration intentions 
of EU10 migrants are known to be rather transitory. For example, of workers registered 
in Worker Registration Scheme in the UK in 2008 62% envisaged staying in the UK for 
less than three months, up from 59% in 2007 and 55% in 2006  (Kahanec, Zaiceva and 
Zimmermann, 2010). The long-run trends in return migration are yet to be evaluated. 
First evidence by Hazans (2012) for the Baltic countries indicates that significant shares 
of migrants are indeed returning. Whereas they used to be positively selected from 
migrant populations in the period immediately following the 2004 enlargement, after 
2006 the share of high-skilled workers among returnees is lower than among emigrant 
cohorts they come from (ibid.). Such developments could undermine the prospects for 
gainful brain circulation from the perspective of sending countries.     
 
Hazans (2012) further reports that compared to the pre-crisis period, out-migration 
intensified in Estonia and even more so in Latvia during the crisis. The worsened 
economic conditions disproportionally pushed the less skilled as well as ethnic minorities 
to migration, mainly Russian-speakers. The author proposes that the stronger response of 
Latvians may have to do with their perception of the crisis as not only of financial but 
also of a systemic nature. Indeed, Latvian migration became more long-term oriented 
during the crisis. The overall increase can be linked to increased unemployment and 
worsened economic prospects. Perhaps the most detrimental effect of the crisis is that 
high-skilled workers became underrepresented among returnees, undermining the 
prospects of gainful brain circulation for these sending countries.  
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7. Conclusions 
 
Aging, diminishing young cohorts and a lack of innovation potential, and structural 
mismatches in the labor market resulting in unemployment and skill shortages at the 
same time are some of the most important labor market challenges in the EU. These 
challenges have contributed to and are themselves aggravated by the current debt crisis in 
the Eurozone. On this backdrop embracing the freedom of movement of workers in an 
enlarged EU as a powerful tool to improve allocation of human capital and thus combat 
some of these challenges would seem rational. Yet, fear and controversies entangled the 
implementation of free labor mobility vis-à-vis the countries that joined the EU in 2004 
and 2007.        
 
Painstaking empirical analyses based on theoretical underpinnings and hard data 
surveyed in this study tell a straight story, however. The free movement of labor in an 
enlarged EU can with little doubt be considered a success story of EU integration and 
enlargement. It resulted in substantial relocation of labor that has improved the allocation 
of human capital in the EU. These new hands and brains appear to have been absorbed by 
the receiving labor markets rather seamlessly. In particular, except for some 
downskilling, we do not observe any significant negative effects on (un)employment or 
wages in the EU15. Similarly, the hypothesis of welfare tourism has not been 
substantiated.  
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The sending countries appear to have been relieved of some currently redundant labor 
resulting from skill-mismatches in their labor markets, as well being relieved of the 
related fiscal burden. Some new skill shortages have emerged, however. Additionally, the 
loss of young and skilled labor may be rather worrying in view of the dismal 
demographic trends in most of the new member states, as well as for the sustainability of 
their public finances. Of key importance for the sending countries is thus their ability to 
benefit from brain gain resulting from brain circulation in an enlarged EU. This includes 
a proper policy approach to the issues of return and circular migration and inefficient 
downskilling. Remittances partly compensate for the loss of human capital possibly 
characterizing the early stages of post-enlargement migration. Migrants themselves, as 
well as their families, appear to have traded the benefits of migration against some 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs to their benefit.   
 
Transitional arrangements seem to have affected not only the direction, but also the 
composition of post-enlargement migration flows. A full evaluation of their effects is yet 
to come, but the evidence so far is that the countries that delayed liberalizing the access 
to their labor market for citizens from the new member states disproportionally lost 
skilled and young migrants, who chose more welcoming countries such as Ireland and the 
UK. Another possibly negative effect is that transitional arrangements led to spurious 
self-employment as a strategy to circumvent them.    
 
The current debt crisis in the EU is a challenge on its own. Although the effects of free 
labor mobility in the EU are yet to be fully evaluated, based on the available literature we 
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propose that the freedom of movement in an enlarged EU not only contributes to the 
European Project by strengthening the social fabric and improving cohesion in the EU, it 
does so also by directly contributing to its economic viability. Namely, it provides for an 
improved allocative efficiency of European labor markets, a higher innovation potential, 
increased utilization of resources and their higher productivity, and the resulting fiscal 
relief, all enabling the EU to thrive economically, socially, and politically in a globalized 
world.         
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Citizens from new EU member states residing in the EU15. 
  
Migrants from the EU8 Migrants from the EU2 
  
Total 
Percent of 
EU8 
population 
Percent of 
EU15 
population 
Total 
Percent of 
EU2 
population 
Percent of 
EU15 
population 
1997 673,324 0.91 0.18 249,781 0.81 0.07 
1998 674,972 0.91 0.18 234,743 0.76 0.06 
1999 717,976 0.97 0.19 271,657 0.88 0.07 
2000 753,056 1.02 0.20 315,699 1.03 0.08 
2001 800,534 1.09 0.21 391,045 1.28 0.10 
2002 851,250 1.16 0.22 509,160 1.71 0.13 
2003 942,321 1.29 0.25 711,930 2.40 0.19 
2004 1,006,851 1.38 0.26 916,298 3.10 0.24 
2005 1,235,429 1.69 0.32 1,109,570 3.77 0.29 
2006 1,627,625 2.23 0.42 1,376,956 4.69 0.35 
2007 2,027,651 2.78 0.52 1,971,968 6.74 0.50 
2008 2,252,681 3.09 0.57 2,348,523 8.05 0.60 
2009 2,288,600 3.13 0.58 2,564,008 8.81 0.65 
Source: Based on data provided in Holland et al. (2011), Eurostat population statistics, 
and own calculations. 
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Figure 1. Effects of skilled and unskilled immigration  
 
Figure 2. Effects of skilled and unskilled out-migration  
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Figure 3. Net inflows of EU8 and EU2 citizens to the EU15. 
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Source: Own calculations based on Holland et al. (2011) data. 
 
Figure 4. The share of sending country’s population residing in the EU15.  
a. Visegrad countries and Slovenia b. The Baltic states 
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c. Countries acceding the EU in 2007 d. EU8 and EU2 
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Notes: In percent of source country’s population. 
Source: Own calculation based on Holland et al. (2011) data and Eurostat population 
statistics.   
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Figure 5. The share of EU8 citizens residing in EU15. 
a. Liberalization as of May 1, 2004 b. Liberalization in May – July 2006 
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c. Liberalization May 2007 – May 2009 d. Liberalization as of May 1, 2011 
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Notes: In percent of host country’s population. 
Source: Own calculation based on Holland et al. (2011) data and Eurostat population 
statistics.   
 
Figure 6. The share of EU2 citizens residing in the EU15. 
a. Southern Europe b. Scandinavia 
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Notes: In percent of host country’s population. 
Source: Own calculation based on Holland et al. (2011) data and Eurostat population 
statistics.   
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Figure 7. Proportions of EU8 and EU2 citizens in EU15. 
a. EU8 
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b. EU2 
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Notes: In percent of total EU8 and EU2 populations resident in EU15. 
Source: Own calculation based on Fic 2011 data and Eurostat population statistics.   
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Figure 8. Educational attainment of EU10 and EU2 citizens in the EU15. 
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Source: Own calculation based on the EU Labour Force Survey, 2009. 
Notes: In percent of total EU8 and EU2 populations resident in the EU15 above and 
including 16 years of age, excluding conscripts on compulsory military or community 
service as well as anyone whose highest level of education or training successfully 
completed was attained after his or her immigration to the current country of residence in 
the EU15. No data available for Malta. Germany excluded due to no information on 
migrants’ country of birth.  
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Figure 9. Migration intentions in Europe 
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Source: Eurostat (2010), data collection November-December 2009. 
Notes: Answers to the question QC10: Do you envisage to work in a country outside (our 
country) at some time in the future? DK stands for “do not know”, or no answer. Sorted 
by “Yes”. EU8+2 calculated as a simple average of the values for the EU8 and EU2 
countries. 
 
Figure 10. The time horizon of migration intentions in Europe 
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Source: Eurostat (2010), data collection November-December 2009. 
Notes: Answers to the question QC11: How soon are you likely to work there? The 
universe consists of those respondents that answered “Yes” to QC10: Do you envisage to 
work in a country outside (our country) at some time in the future? “DK yet” stands for 
“do not know yet; DK stands for “do not know”, or no answer. Sorted by <6 months. 
EU8+2 calculated as a simple average of the values for the EU8 and EU2 countries. 
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Figure 11. The migration imminence matrix, EU8+2 
a. Work abroad within six months b. Work abroad within a year 
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Source: Eurostat (2010), data collection November-December 2009. 
Notes: Based on the answers to the question QC10: “Do you envisage to work in a 
country outside (our country) at some time in the future?” and QC11: “How soon are you 
likely to work there?”. The share of population answering “Yes” to the first question is on 
the x-axis, and, of those, the share answering “During the next 6 months” is on the y-axis. 
Values normalized with 1 representing the highest, and 0 the lowest, value observed in 
the EU27. EU8+2 calculated as a simple average of EU8+2 countries. 
